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PREVIEW; State v. Smith: Constitutionality of Lifetime Satellite 




Oral argument is scheduled for Wednesday, February 17, 2021, at 9:30 
a.m. in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek 
Justice Building, in Helena, Montana. Deborah S. Smith is expected to 
argue on behalf of Appellant Wesley Smith (“Smith”), and Jonathan M. 





The issue before the Court is whether Montana Code Annotated § 45-
5-625(4)(b), which mandates lifetime satellite location monitoring (“GS 
monitoring”) for certain classes of sexual offenders, violates the Fourth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article II, sections 10, 11, 22, and 28 of the Montana Constitution. This 
oral argument presents an opportunity for the Court to rule on an issue that 
has been the subject of several recent court decisions in other states. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A jury convicted Smith in June 2017 of felony sexual abuse of 
children1 pertaining to his 9-year-old stepdaughter.2 The district court 
sentenced Smith to 100 years in the Montana State Prison with 80 of those 
years suspended3 and designated Smith as a Level I sexual offender with 
a low risk of re-offending.4 
No parole restrictions were imposed.5 After serving his 20-year prison 
sentence, if he has not been paroled, Smith will be discharged to probation, 
during which time his remaining 80-year suspended sentence may be 
discharged under certain circumstances.6  
Montana’s Sexual Abuse of Children law establishes sentencing 
guidelines for sexual crimes involving children.7 If the victim was 12 years 
old or younger, the guidelines provide that offenders released after the 
statutory minimum jail time are subject to supervision by the department 
of corrections and are required to participate in continuous GPS 
monitoring as set forth under § 46-23-1010 for the remainder of the 
offender’s life.8 The district court found these statutes required lifetime 
GPS monitoring as a condition of Smith’s eventual parole or probation and 
included it in his sentence.9 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, Class of 2021. 
1 MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 45-5-625(1)(a), 45-5-625(5)(b)(ii) (2015). 
2 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1–2; Appellee’s Response Brief at 1 (The jury found that Smith 
knowingly made his stepdaughter dance on a “stripper pole” in her underwear.). 
3 Id. at 3 
4 Id. at 41. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 42. 
7 See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-5-625. 
8 Id. § 45-5-625(4)(b). 
9 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 41. 
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Smith did not object to this condition at sentencing but challenged the 
constitutionality of the condition in the present appeal.10 Smith requested 
that the Court strike the lifetime GPS monitoring condition from his 
sentence.11 
 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Appellant Wesley Smith 
 
Smith argues that § 45-5-625(4)(b) facially violates the Fourth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and 
sections 10, 11, 22, and 28 of Article II of the Montana Constitution. 
 
1. Unreasonable Searches and Right to Privacy 
 
Smith argues that lifetime GPS monitoring constitutes an ongoing 
unreasonable search without probable cause, which violates the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and violates 
Montana’s right to individual privacy as set forth in Article II, section 10 
of the Montana Constitution. Smith contends that Article II, section 10 
provides “broader protection than the Fourth Amendment.”12  
Smith relies on State v. Siegal,13 which established that the right to 
privacy in Montana extends to the government’s use of technology in 
searches, to argue GPS monitoring equates to an unlawful search.14 Smith 
also cites Grady v. North Carolina15 in which the United States Supreme 
Court defined GPS monitoring as a Fourth Amendment “search,” then 
moves on to discuss GPS monitoring sentencing statutes that were found 
unconstitutional in North Carolina,16 Georgia,17 and South Carolina.18 
 
2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
 
Smith next shifts into a discussion of constitutional prohibitions 
against cruel and unusual punishment under Article II, section 22 of the 
Montana Constitution and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. Smith notes the Montana sentencing statute at 
 
10 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 37, 41. 
11 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 44. 
12 Id. at 35. 
13 934 P.2d 176, 180 (1997) (holding that thermal imaging in a criminal investigation constitutes a 
“search” and that the use of thermal imaging technology by the government without a search warrant 
implicates individual privacy interests and requires a showing of a compelling state interest). 
14 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 37. 
15 575 U.S. 306 (2015) (holding that attaching location monitoring devices to individuals without their 
consent constitutes a search). 
16 North Carolina v. Grady, 831 S.E.2d 542 (N.C. 2019) (holding that lifetime GPS monitoring of 
defendant based on their recidivist offender status was an unconstitutional Fourth Amendment search). 
17 Park v. Georgia, 825 S.E.2d 147, 152–53 (Ga. 2019) (holding that a law mandating GPS monitoring 
for “sexually dangerous predators” after they completed their sentences violated the Fourth 
Amendment). 
18 South Carolina v. Ross, 815 S.E.2d 754, 755, 758 (S.C. 2018) (holding that GPS monitoring for 
sexual offenders who fail to register must be analyzed case-by-case, rather than being an automatic 
consequence of failure to register); Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 38–39. 
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issue does not provide for any “individualized determination” before a 
defendant is sentenced to lifetime GPS monitoring.19 
Smith emphasizes several “mitigating circumstances”— this was his 
first sexual offense, the offense did not involve touching, and he has not 
exhibited patterns of sexual abuse, inter alia—that led to his designation 
as a Level 1 sex offender.20 He argues that despite the mitigating factors 
and his Level 1 designation, under the law, the statute mandated the district 
court to impose the lifetime GPS monitoring condition.21 Smith does not 
directly state that this sentencing condition constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment. In his reply to the State’s Opening Brief, Smith contends that 
the facts and circumstances of his own case do not change the fact that the 
statute is overbroad and allows no judicial discretion over whether lifetime 
GPS monitoring is excessive or grossly disproportionate in certain cases.22 
 
3. Restoration of Rights 
 
Smith then attacks the sentence itself. He notes that his probation and 
parole officers could recommend a conditional discharge of his post-
release supervision, but that even then, the lifetime GPS monitoring 
requirement would remain in effect.23 Smith asserts that the monitoring 
requirement subjects defendants who have had their sentences fully 
discharged to continued punishment and invasions of privacy in violation 
of Article II, section 28 of the Montana Constitution.24 He also argues it 
violates § 46-18-801(2) which mandates that “all civil rights” be restored 
once a sentence expires so that defendant is left in the same position as “if 
the conviction had not occurred.” 25 
 
B. Appellee State of Montana 
 
The State contends that Smith’s claim should be dismissed whether it 
is deemed to be a facial or an as-applied constitutional challenge. The State 
argues Smith failed to meet his burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the sentencing statute in question is unconstitutional.26 The 
State notes that Smith must prove that either no set of circumstances exist 
under which the statute would be constitutional or that the statute “lacks a 
‘plainly legitimate sweep’” to succeed as a facial challenge.27 
The State argues that Smith failed to sufficiently explain how 
Montana’s right of privacy and search and seizure protections make this 
sentencing condition unconstitutional and how the condition qualifies as 
cruel and unusual punishment.28 The State contends that to establish the 
statute’s unconstitutional reach, Smith must prove that lifetime GPS 
monitoring “would be an unreasonable and constitutionally impermissible 
 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 40–41. 
21 Id. 
22 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 9. 
23 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 42–43. 
24 Id. at 43. 
25 MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-18-801(2). 
26 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 36. 
27 Id. at 36 (quoting In re S.M., 403 P.3d 324, 326 (Mont. 2017)). 
28 Id. at 38–39. 
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search in every case, for every type of offense, and for every offender” 
under every type of criminal conduct captured by the act.29 The State 
argues that instead of doing that, Smith has merely described his own facts 
and mitigating circumstances and argued about why the statute is 
unreasonable as it is applied to him.30  
As such, the State describes Smith’s claims as a “thinly veiled ‘as-
applied’ challenge.”31 The State argues that under the State v. Lenihan32 
rule, Smith cannot bring the claim on appeal without having first objected 
to the sentencing condition at the sentencing hearing.33 The State contends 
that because Smith’s claim should be considered an as-applied challenge, 
Smith waived the challenge by not objecting at sentencing, so his claim is 
not reviewable by the Court.34 




Two issues raised by the parties likely merit most of the attention 
during the oral argument: (1) whether or not Smith raises an as-applied 
challenge or a facial challenge to the statute, and (2) whether or not 
continued GPS monitoring is an unconstitutional restriction on individuals 
who have completely served their sentences.  
 
A. As-Applied or Facial Challenge 
 
The Court could make quick work of Smith’s claim if it believes that 
Smith’s challenge is an as-applied challenge as the State contends. As-
applied challenges are not reviewable without prior objection at 
sentencing, while facial claims may be raised on appeal without first 
objecting.36 A facial claim asserts that a statute is unconstitutional on its 
face by attacking the constitutionality of the statute itself.37 As-applied 
challenges, on the other hand, attack the constitutionality of the individual 
sentence in question.38 
The State’s argument that Smith’s cruel and unusual punishment 
assertions look like an as-applied challenge has merit. Smith’s short 
discussion of cruel and unusual punishment revolves around the mitigating 
circumstances the district court analyzed when designating Smith a low-
risk Level 1 sexual offender.39 Although not expressly stated, Smith’s 
position appears to be that because he, individually, has been deemed to 
be a low-risk offender, lifetime GPS monitoring is disproportionate to his 
crime and is therefore cruel and unusual. This looks like a challenge to the 
sentence rather than the statute, so it is more “as-applied” than “facial” in 
nature. If the Court follows this logic, then it should find that Smith waived 
 
29 Id. at 39. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 40. 
32 602 P.2d 997, 1000 (Mont. 1979). 
33 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 40. 
34 Id. at 41. 
35 Id. at 41. 
36 State v. Yang, 452 P.3d 897, 900 (Mont. 2019). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 39–41. 
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this cruel and unusual punishment claim when he did not object to the 
condition at sentencing.  
Smith’s other constitutional assertions, however, are more broadly 
tailored toward the sentencing statute and are not directed at Smith’s 
individualized circumstances. For example, Smith does not mention his 
own facts or circumstances when arguing that the sentencing condition is 
an unequivocally unreasonable search and infringement on the restoration 
of rights post-sentence completion. These claims will likely be found to 
be facial challenges to the sentencing statute and, thus, valid on appeal. 
Additionally, given that the Court granted oral argument on this 
constitutional issue, it is unlikely that it views the entirety of Smith’s 
argument as being an as-applied challenge.  
 
B. Unreasonable Searches and Restoration of Rights 
 
The heart of the oral argument will likely lie in discussing the 
developing body of caselaw surrounding GPS monitoring and its 
applicability and persuasiveness in Montana. In his Opening Brief, Smith 
did not establish a clear argument as to why the sentencing condition 
should be considered an unreasonable search, but he will likely elaborate 
on that contention in his oral argument by analogizing § 45-5-625(4)(b) to 
the statutes struck down by other state courts.  
The State will likely counter by distinguishing the other statutes from 
§ 45-5-625(4)(b) and reiterating that regardless of what other states are 
doing, Smith failed to meet his burden to show that “no set of 
circumstances exists” under which the statute would be valid or that the 
statute lacks a “plainly legitimate sweep.”40  
The Court might look favorably on the state cases and follow the 
burgeoning movement to strike down unqualified lifetime GPS monitoring 
statutes, but the Court’s interest in these out-of-state decisions is unclear. 
If the Court focuses on whether or not Smith has met his burden under the 
In re S.M. test cited by the State, Smith may have trouble in proving that 
lifetime GPS monitoring is never under any circumstances acceptable (i.e., 
consider the case of a high-risk violent Level 3 sexual offender). Unless 
Smith can establish that GPS monitoring constitutes an ongoing and 
unreasonable search at all times, Smith will not likely have met his burden.  
Smith’s final constitutional argument—one that went entirely 
unaddressed in the State’s response—is his most salient. Article II, section 
28 requires that “[f]ull rights are restored by termination of state 
supervision for any offense against the state.”41 Montana statutory law 
doubles down on that premise by establishing that an individual who 
serves their sentence is to have all of their rights returned “as if the 
conviction had not occurred.”42  
The Court has established that the restoration of rights is not all-
encompassing and only applies to “those rights commonly considered to 
be political and civil rights” like the right to vote, serve as a juror, and hold 
 
40 See Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 38 (quoting In re S.M., 403 P.3d 324, 326 (Mont. 
2017)). 
41 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 28. 
42 MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-18-801(2). 
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public office.43 Pertinently, the Court has found that post-sentence sex 
offender registration requirements that effect an individual’s “right to exist 
free from state regulation, to travel, and to pursue employment” do not 
violate Article II, section 28.44 
Here, § 45-5-625(4)(b) mandates lifetime GPS monitoring regardless 
of whether or not a sentence is discharged. Smith might argue that 
Montana’s individual right to privacy is a civil right in the state of Montana 
that should be fully restored to people who have served their sentences. 
That argument holds weight, as the Court and the Montana Constitution 
recognize the right of privacy as being one that can be overcome only by 
a compelling state interest.45 
Given the broad, indiscriminatory nature of the GPS monitoring 
requirement and its applicability to all defendants, regardless of the 
seriousness of their crimes, the State may struggle to assert a compelling 
interest sufficient to overcome the right of privacy. If Smith makes this 
argument and the State does not provide a sufficient governmental interest 
in perpetually limiting privacy rights for all sex offenders subject to § 45-
5-625(4)(b), the Court should hold the statute unconstitutional under 




The Court is unlikely to dismiss all of Smith’s claims on the basis that 
they are as-applied constitutional challenges. Smith might not persuade 
the Court he met his burden of showing that the statute is unconstitutional 
under all circumstances based solely on his discussion of out-of-state case 
law. It is possible, however, that the Court will determine that the 
unqualified lifetime GPS monitoring requirement in § 45-5-625(4)(b) is 
unconstitutional under Article II, section 28 because it continues to restrict 
the fundamental right to privacy of individuals even after they have served 
their sentence. No matter how the Court decides this case, the decision will 
set a precedent for Montana on GPS monitoring as a sentencing condition 
moving forward. 
 
43 State v. Gafford, 563 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Mont. 1977). 
44 Wagner v. State, 85 P.3d 750, 752-53 (Mont. 2004). 
45 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10. 
